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Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference 
in Domestic Portfolios 
JOSHUA D. COVAL and TOBIAS J. MOSKOWITZ* 
ABSTERACT 
The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well-documented characteristic 
of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for invest- 
ing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. 
investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, 
particularly small, highly levered firms that produce nontraded goods. These re- 
sults suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal investors 
may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the rela- 
tion between investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on 
several well-documented asset pricing anomalies. 
THE STRONG PREFERENCE FOR DOMESTIC EQUITIES exhibited by investors in inter- 
national markets, despite the well-documented gains from international di- 
versification,' remains an important yet unresolved empirical puzzle in 
financial economics. As French and Poterba (1991) document, U.S. equity 
traders allocate nearly 94 percent of their funds to domestic securities, even 
though the U.S. equity market comprises less than 48 percent of the global 
equity market. This phenomenon, dubbed the "home bias puzzle," exists in 
other countries as well, where investors appear to invest only in their home 
country, virtually ignoring foreign opportunities. 
Though such behavior appears to be grossly inefficient from a diversifi- 
cation standpoint, academics have offered a variety of explanations for this 
phenomenon. Initial explanations focused on barriers to international in- 
vestment such as governmental restrictions on foreign and domestic capital 
flows, foreign taxes, and high transactions costs.2 Although many of these 
obstacles to foreign investment have substantially diminished, the propen- 
sity to invest in one's home country remains strong. Thus, other explana- 
tions have been put forth, which can be broadly grouped into two categories: 
* Coval is from the University of Michigan Business School and Moskowitz is from the Grad- 
uate School of Business, University of Chicago. We thank Michael Brennan, Bhagwan Chowdhry, 
Gordon Delianedis, Mark Grinblatt, Gur Huberman, Ed Leamer, Tyler Shumway, two anony- 
mous referees, the editor, Ren6 Stulz, and seminar participants at MIT (Sloan) and Michigan 
for helpful comments and discussions. Moskowitz thanks the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices for financial support. 
1 Grubel (1968), Solnik (1974), Eldor, Pines, and Schwartz (1988), and DeSantis and Gerard 
(1997), among others, document significant benefits from diversifying internationally. 
2 For examples of such explanations see Black (1974) and Stulz (1981a). 
2045 
2046 The Journal of Finance 
explanations associated with the existence of national boundaries (perhaps 
the distinguishing feature of international capital markets), and explana- 
tions associated with a preference for geographic proximity. Under the first 
set of explanations, when capital crosses political and monetary boundaries, 
it faces exchange rate fluctuation, variation in regulation, culture, and tax- 
ation, and sovereign risk, which many home bias explanations focus on as 
the primary factors discouraging investment abroad. Some studies argue 
that informational differences between foreign and domestic investors are 
the driving force behind home bias, others claim that the primary cause is 
investor concern about hedging the output of firms that produce goods not 
traded internationally.3 
A key point largely overlooked in the debate, however, is that not all home 
bias explanations rely on properties unique to the international economy. 
For instance, the existence of national boundaries may amplify information 
asymmetries and the concern for hedging nontradable goods, but these fric- 
tions arise even in the absence of country borders-that is, when only geo- 
graphic distance separates an investor from potential investments. For 
example, investors may have easier access to information about companies 
located near them, preferring to hold local firms rather than distant ones for 
which they have a relative information advantage. Local investors can talk 
to employees, managers, and suppliers of the firm; they may obtain impor- 
tant information from the local media; and they may have close personal ties 
with local executives-all of which may provide them with an information 
advantage in local stocks. Likewise, investors may prefer proximate invest- 
ments in order to hedge against price increases in local services or in goods 
not easily traded outside the local area. More generally, investors may have 
a preference for geographically proximate investments arising from a num- 
ber of potential sources. For instance, investors may simply feel more com- 
fortable about local companies, or firms they hear a lot about, or they may 
have a psychological desire to invest in the local community.4 Local broker- 
age firms also may encourage local investment, particularly if close ties ex- 
ist between brokers and local corporate executives, for which some mutual 
benefit can be derived from keeping local money in the community. 
This paper investigates whether investors have a preference for geograph- 
ically proximate investments and assesses the importance of such a prefer- 
ence for portfolio choice. Since geographic separation is certainly part of 
both domestic and international settings, we analyze the effect of geographic 
proximity (distance) on investment portfolio choice by avoiding confounding 
factors due to political and monetary boundaries by restricting our attention 
3 Low (1993), Brennan and Cao (1997), and Coval (1996) offer asymmetric information-based 
explanations of international capital market segmentation. Stockman and Dellas (1989) and a 
number of subsequent papers suggest the hedging of nontraded goods consumption as a motive 
for holding domestic securities. 
4 Huberman (1998) finds that individuals choose to invest in their local Regional Bell oper- 
ating companies more often than any other "baby Bell" even though the companies are listed on 
the same exchange, and he attributes such behavior to a cognitive bias for the familiar. 
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to the domestic economy. If international portfolio choice is influenced by 
frictions associated with distance, then these frictions should play an iden- 
tifiable domestic role as well. 
More generally, this study supplements a recent resurgence in research 
documenting the economic significance of geography, and represents the first 
attempt to uncover the effect of distance on domestic portfolio choice.5 This 
line of inquiry not only highlights a potential new role for geography in the 
economy, but may also shed light on various explanations for the inter- 
national home bias puzzle. 
Specifically, we measure the degree of preference for geographically prox- 
imate equities exhibited by U.S. money managers in their holdings of U.S.- 
headquartered companies. Using a unique database of mutual fund manager 
and company location, identified by latitude and longitude, we find that the 
average U.S. fund manager invests in companies that are between 160 to 
184 kilometers, or 9 to 11 percent, closer to her than the average firm she 
could have held. Alternatively, one of every 10 companies in a fund manag- 
er's portfolio is chosen because it is located in the same city as the manager. 
Using a variety of measures, the null hypothesis of no local equity prefer- 
ence (or local bias) is consistently rejected, demonstrating that the distance 
between investors and potential investments is a key determinant of U.S. 
investment manager portfolio choice. 
We also wish to determine why U.S. investment managers, in a setting of 
a single currency and relatively little geographic variation in regulation, 
taxation, political risk, language, and culture, prefer to hold companies lo- 
cated close to them.6 Some clues may exist in how the cross section of firm 
and manager characteristics relates to the degree of local investment 
preference. 
We find that local equity preference is strongly related to three firm char- 
acteristics: firm size, leverage, and output tradability. Specifically, locally 
held firms tend to be small and highly levered, and they tend to produce 
goods not traded internationally. These results suggest an information- 
' Geography continues to play a key role in the domestic economy despite sharp declines in 
transportation and communication costs and vast increases in information technology, and is 
the subject of renewed academic debate. For instance, Audretsch and Feldman (1996) test the 
importance of geographic location for innovative activity in various industries, and Audretsch 
and Stephan (1996) examine the role of university-based scientists in local biotechnology firms. 
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) show that knowledge spillovers tend to be geograph- 
ically localized, although this localization fades over time, and Lerner (1995) finds distance to 
be an important determinant of the board membership of venture capitalists, where venture 
capital organizations with offices less than five miles from a firm's headquarters are shown to 
be twice as likely to provide board members to the firm as those more than 500 miles away. For 
additional references on the economic significance of geography see Krugman (1991), Lucas 
(1993), and Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1995). 
6 It could be the case that the clients of these money managers are holding a geographically 
diverse set of funds, and that managers, therefore, invest locally in order to minimize informa- 
tion gathering and travel costs. However, Coval and Moskowitz (1998b) find that clients exhibit 
a strong preference for local managers. 
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based explanation for local equity preference because small, highly levered 
firms, whose products are primarily consumed locally, are exactly those firms 
where one would expect local investors to have easy access to information 
and they are firms in which such information would be most valuable. Ad- 
ditionally, the importance of output tradability may lend empirical support 
for the nontraded goods explanation of the international home bias puzzle, 
although it is hard to believe that the role of internationally traded goods 
output significantly affects proximity preferences in a domestic setting. Con- 
sistent with these findings, Kang and Stulz (1997), in their examination of 
foreign ownership of Japanese stocks, find that foreign investors under- 
weight small, highly levered firms, and firms that do not have significant 
exports, which they claim may be a response to the severe information asym- 
metries associated with such firms. 
Furthermore, since size and leverage are associated with higher average 
returns, and aid in explaining the cross section of expected stock returns,7 
the relation between the propensity to invest locally and these firm charac- 
teristics may have important asset pricing implications. For example, Fama 
and French (1992) argue that such characteristics may proxy for firm risk 
sensitivities, thus compensating investors with higher average returns. Dan- 
iel and Titman (1997) suggest that it is the characteristics themselves that 
seem to be related to expected returns, having little resemblance to risk. 
Although the interpretation of the relation between these characteristics and 
average returns can be debated, evidence in this paper indicates that the 
influence of geographic proximity on portfolio composition and these cross- 
sectional asset pricing anomalies may be linked in an important way. 
Finally, our analysis may offer insight for determining the importance of 
distance in international portfolio choice relative to that of national bound- 
aries, assessing how much of the "home bias" phenomenon can truly be con- 
sidered an international puzzle. Extrapolating our findings to the international 
scale, we find that distance may account for roughly one-third of the ob- 
served home country bias in U.S. portfolios estimated by French and Pot- 
erba (1991). That is, as much as one-third of the home bias puzzle may only 
be a feature of a geographic proximity preference and the relative scale of 
the world economy, rather than a consequence of national borders. These 
results should be interpreted only as qualitative evidence of the importance 
of distance in the international setting, since the amount of international 
home bias accounted for by a preference for geographic proximity is sensi- 
tive to the form of extrapolation employed. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes 
the data and methodology employed in our study. Section II outlines and 
conducts a test for local equity preference, and Section III examines the 
7 See Banz (1981), Bhandari (1988), and Fama and French (1992). Fama and French find 
leverage and market-to-book to be redundant as firm distress measures and find market to 
book to have greater explanatory power for expected returns. In our analysis, firm leverage 
better captures local equity preference than the market-to-book ratio. 
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relation between a variety of firm characteristics and the degree of proxim- 
ity preference on portfolio choice. Section IV extends the analysis to include 
a number of fund manager characteristics, and Section V concludes. 
I. Data and Methodology 
Our primary data source is Nelson's 1996 Directory of Investment Manag- 
ers, which contains the cross section of 1995 holdings data on the largest 
U.S. money managers along with their location (city and state). From Com- 
pact Disclosure, we obtain the headquarters location of every U.S. company 
covered by that database.8 Using latitude and longitude data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau's Gazetteer Place and Zip code Database, we match each fund 
manager and the headquarters of each U.S. company with the latitude and 
longitude coordinates. To create our sample, we identify the top 10 holdings 
of each fund managed by a U.S. investment manager and investing primar- 
ily in U.S. equities for 1995,9 which we define as those funds for which at 
least five of the top 10 holdings are U.S.-headquartered firms. Using the 
coordinate data, we compute an arclength between each manager and every 
firm in which the manager invests or could have invested. 
To prevent outliers from dominating the analysis, we restrict our analysis 
to the continental United States, excluding firms and funds located in Alaska, 
Hawaii, or Puerto Rico. Although including fund managers and firms lo- 
cated in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico may potentially provide the stron- 
gest evidence for a geographic proximity preference, our results are only 
slightly strengthened when we include these funds and firms in the analy- 
sis. Since there are very few such funds and firms in our sample, including 
them marginally affects the results. Hence, to be conservative and for brev- 
ity, all results in the paper exclude Alaskan, Hawaiian, and Puerto Rican 
funds and firms. This also eliminates the possibility that our results are 
largely driven by these remote locations exaggerating the effect of distance, 
or that our results are due to more significant cultural differences between 
these three locations and the rest of the continental United States. 
Since we wish to focus on the behavior of managers that are in a position 
to make portfolio choices, we exclude all index funds from the analysis. The 
dataset also includes information on fund size, research sources, number of 
firms followed by the manager, and whether the manager has any branch 
offices, as well as a number of firm characteristics obtained from the 1995 
COMPUSTAT tapes and the 1995 Compact Disclosure database. 
8 We use the headquarters location as opposed to the state of incorporation, for the simple 
reason that companies tend to incorporate in a state with favorable tax laws, bankruptcy laws, 
etc., rather than for any operational reasons, and typically do not have the majority of their 
operations in their state of incorporation. In fact, very few firms in our sample were headquar- 
tered in the same state they were incorporated. 
9 The Nelson's dataset only records the top 10 positions of each investment manager. The 10 
largest positions typically account for about 30 percent of a manager's total asset value. 
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Since a wide variety of restrictions prohibit mutual funds from investing 
in certain companies, our universe of available assets consists only of those 
companies held by at least one mutual fund,10 and firms not covered by 
COMPUSTAT or Compact Disclosure are also excluded. Furthermore, we 
ignore investments made by one manager in another's fund. While such 
investments may be locally biased as well,11 the funds may still ultimately 
end up invested in a geographically diversified portfolio. Relatively few such 
investments occur in our sample, and hence are excluded for simplicity. Thus, 
our final sample consists of 1,189 investment managers running 2,183 dif- 
ferent U.S. equity funds with primary holdings in 2,736 different U.S. com- 
panies. These managers account for approximately $1.8 trillion of investment 
in U.S. equities. Table I displays summary statistics for our database of 
investment managers. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the geographic distribution of our sample 
of fund managers and the companies they hold across the United States. The 
axes are marked with the actual latitude and longitude degree values. In- 
terestingly, the graph's distribution of firms and managers resembles a plot 
of U.S. population by location, suggesting that companies and investment 
managers simply locate close to the supply of human capital. Overall, in- 
vestment managers appear to cluster together more than companies, sug- 
gesting that they are not simply locating close to labor. For instance, the 
New York and Boston areas contain a disproportionate share of managers 
relative to the rest of the country. However, there is generally a fair degree 
of dispersion of managers throughout the country. In fact, managers from all 
of the lower 48 states, except Wyoming and the Dakotas, are represented in 
our sample. 
II. A Test for Local Equity Preference 
Investors seem to exhibit preferences for certain securities based on a 
variety of potential characteristics, including risk and return, liquidity, tax 
considerations, and possibly due to several cognitive biases. In particular, 
Falkenstein (1996) and others have shown that mutual fund managers also 
prefer certain types of stocks, for a variety of potential reasons. For in- 
stance, Falkenstein (1996) documents that mutual fund managers prefer large, 
liquid stocks, and stocks that belong to the S&P 500. However, to date, no 
one has examined whether investors, and in particular fund managers, ex- 
hibit geographic preferences, particularly within a domestic setting. In this 
section, we outline a test for geographically local preferences among fund 
managers, attempting to control for other factors that might lead to a spu- 
10 Our results are largely unchanged when we expand the universe to all 10,523 firms for 
which we could obtain data. 
" Coval and Moskowitz (1998b) find that geographic proximity plays a central role in de- 
termining institutional investors' choice of investment managers. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics of U.S. Investment Managers 
All data are from Nelson's 1996 Directory of Investment Managers. Summary statistics are 
reported on funds managed by U.S.-based investment managers that invest primarily in U.S. 
equities, defined as those funds for which at least five of the top 10 holdings are U.S.- 
headquartered firms. Fund managers located in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico are excluded, 
and index funds are also removed from the sample. The average percentage of research and 
number of companies followed regularly are obtained via a survey questionnaire Nelson's sends 
to each investment manager. Managers are asked to allocate the percentage of research con- 
ducted among three categories: (1) in-house, (2) on the street, and (3) consultant/other, as well 
as report the number of firms they follow on a "regular basis." 
Total number of managers: 1189 
Managers with branch offices: 426 
Managers based in NYC: 347 
Number of funds under management: 2183 
Total number of different equities held: 2736 















rious finding of such preferences. For example, if fund managers prefer stocks 
belonging to the S&P 500 (regardless of their motivation), and these stocks 
happen to cluster around the New York area, then it will appear as if fund 
managers prefer New York-based stocks. If the managers also locate in the 
New York area, then it will appear as if managers have a proximity prefer- 
ence, when in fact no such preference may exist. 
To assess manager preferences for local stocks, while controlling for other 
preferences managers might have, we conjecture an explicit null hypothesis 
which claims deviations of manager portfolios from a prespecified bench- 
mark should be unrelated to distance. We begin, simply, with the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as our benchmark. However, our null hypoth- 
esis is not the CAPM, but rather that deviations from the CAPM-implied 
portfolio weights are unrelated to distance. We know fund managers deviate 
from holding the market portfolio, but these deviations should be unrelated 
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Figure 1. Geographic distribution of U.S. firms and investment managers. Plot of the 
location of the 1,189 investment fund managers in our sample and the headquarters location of 
the 2,736 different companies they hold. The horizontal axis contains the actual longitude, 
converted to degree values, of the fund manager and corporate headquarters location. The 
vertical axis contains the actual latitude degree values. Latitude and longitude coordinates 
were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau's Gazetteer Place and Zip code Database. A small 
amount of random noise was added to each location, so that the mass of funds and companies 
locating in a given area can be gauged, rather than a single point appearing for New York, for 
example. 
to the manager's distance from the companies she is holding. In other words, 
each manager holds the market weight of each security plus noise, where 
disturbances from market weights should be uncorrelated (under the null) 
with geographic proximity. 
More formally, based on this intuition, our test statistic is developed as 
follows. Suppose there are F different fund managers and n different secu- 
rities in the economy. Let mi j represent the portfolio weight on stockj in the 
benchmark portfolio for which fund manager i is compared. If the market 
portfolio is the relevant benchmark for all funds, then mij is the same across 
all fund managers i and represents the market value weight of stockj in the 
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economy. Next, let hi j represent the actual weight that fund i places on 
stockj. We then compute the distance, di j, between fund manager i and the 
corporate headquarters of stock j as follows: 
dij = arc cos{cos(lati)cos(loni)cos(latj)cos(lonj) 
+ cos (lati ) sin (lon i) cos (latj) sin (lonj) (1) 
+ sin (lati ) sin (latj)}27Tr/360, 
where lat and lon are latitudes and longitudes (measured in degrees) of the 
fund manager and company headquarters locations and r is the radius of the 
earth (- 6378 km). 
Finally, we compute the average distance of fund i from all securities j it 
could have invested in, by weighting the distances between manager i and 
all n stocks in the economy, by the appropriate benchmark weights. More 
formally, 
n 
diY = E mi,jdi,j. (2) 
j=h 
With variables defined as above, our test for whether fund i exhibits a prox- 
imity preference is stated in Proposition 1. 
PROPOSITION 1: Consider the test statistic LBi J>7='(mij - hij,)(di,j/dy'), 
which measures how much closer fund manager i is to her portfolio than to 
her benchmark (as a fraction of the distance she is from her benchmark). If 
deviations from the benchmark portfolio are unrelated to the distance be- 
tween manager i and the securities she chooses to hold, then the null hypoth- 
esis Ho:LBi = 0 cannot be rejected. 
Proof: Defining ,u to be the unknown true mean of LBi, we can express 
the sample mean estimate as:12 
f= E(mij - hi)E( ) + Cov(mij -hi,idi) 
Under the benchmark (in this case the market portfolio), the unconditional 
expectation of deviations from market portfolio weights are zero. Thus, ,u 
will only be nonzero if the second term is nonzero. In other words, the co- 
12 Here, distance can be viewed as a random variable since fund managers choose which 
securities to hold and the weights assigned to them in the portfolio, both of which determine 
the average distance a fund manager is from her holdings. 
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variance between portfolio weight deviations and distance (scaled) deter- 
mines the value of LBi, and whether fund manager i exhibits a geographic 
proximity preference. 
More generally, we compute the local bias test statistic, LBi, for all F fund 
managers and aggregate the results. For ease of notation let M denote an 
(F x n) matrix in which elements of each row are weights of the n securities 
in some benchmark portfolio, where the benchmark can differ for each of the 
F managers. Using the market portfolio as the benchmark for all managers, 
every row mi is the same, where each row represents the market value 
weights of the n securities in the market. In principle, however, the ele- 
ments of M may differ across managers (rows) to reflect other factors that 
may also influence security choice, such as membership in an index against 
which the particular manager is measured. Next, let H denote an (F x n) 
matrix in which element hi j reflects the actual weight of security j in man- 
ager i's portfolio, and define the (F x n) matrix D such that element di j 
is the distance between manager i and security j. Next, let the matrix 
DM denote the (F x F) diagonal matrix of benchmark-weighted distances 
between a given manager and her benchmark portfolio. That is, diagonal 
element d/M = mjdi, where di is the ith row of D. Finally, let w be an (F x 1) 
manager weighting vector whose elements are nonnegative and sum to one. 
That is, w assigns weights to fund managers to determine the importance 
(contribution) each manager has on the test statistic. Two weighting schemes 
are employed: (1) equally weighting each manager (i.e., w equals an (F x 1) 
vector with all elements equal to 1/F), and (2) value weighting each man- 
ager by the fraction of aggregate total asset value each fund comprises. 
The test statistic, LB, is defined as 
LB w'diag((M - H)(D'(DM)-1)) (4) 
with sample moment estimates as follows: 
,= w'diag(E(M - H)E(D'(DM)-1) + Cov(M - H,D'(DM)-1)) (5) 
c2 =w'(diag((M - H)(D'(DM)-1) - w'diag((M - H)(D'(DM)-1)))2, (6) 
where Cov(X,Y) represents the element by element covariance between the 
entries in matrices X and Y. 
A positive LB measure indicates a preference for geographically proximate 
equities, and a negative measure signifies a preference for distant firms. As 
the number of fund managers (F) becomes large, LB approximately follows 
a normal distribution, so test statistics on LB can be computed via sample 
means and variances and a simple mean test on LB can be applied. Addi- 
tionally, we have defined distances as percentages or scaled values of a man- 
ager's average distance from all stocks (i.e., D'(DM)-<) in order to normalize 
distances across fund managers and reduce heteroskedasticity in manager- 
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holding distances. For instance, a fund manager in Seattle is much farther 
away from the average stock than a manager in Chicago, and thus may be 
given more importance and will have higher distance variances than the 
Chicago-based manager if distances are not scaled appropriately. 
This is the basis for our tests of local equity preference. Though our bench- 
mark portfolio has thus far been the market, in subsequent tests we employ 
other benchmark weights as well. For instance, the relevant benchmark for 
aggressive growth fund managers would be the aggregate aggressive growth 
index, defined as the universe of stocks held by aggressive growth fund 
managers. Therefore, for this subset of managers, the LB statistic measures 
deviations from the relevant aggressive growth index that are correlated 
with distance. Similarly, a small stock index is employed as the relevant 
benchmark for small company managers, and so forth. Thus, the elements of 
M differ across managers (rows) to reflect their relevant benchmarks and 
other influences on security choice. Redefining the benchmark in this man- 
ner for subsets of managers alleviates concerns about spurious rejection of 
the null hypothesis, since managers from each subset are compared relative 
to the average manager from that subset. Thus, the exogenous location of 
aggressive growth fund managers, for example, and of growth stocks, cannot 
drive rejection of the null, since the benchmark portfolio weights already 
account for the fact that such managers happen to be located near growth 
stocks. In other words, only deviations in relative portfolio weights (relative 
to other aggressive growth funds) and their correlation with (scaled) dis- 
tance can lead to rejection.13 
A. Empirical Results 
Table II presents the results for our tests of local equity preference. The 
tests differ in terms of the benchmark portfolio weights, M, and the man- 
ager weighting vector, w. When firms are equally weighted, the elements of 
M are all 1/n (i.e., the benchmark portfolio is the equal-weighted index of all 
stocks being held by at least one fund), and when firms are value weighted, 
each column j is firm j's fraction of total market capitalization. When funds 
are equally weighted, the elements of w are all 1/F, and when funds are 
value weighted, element wi is manager i's fraction of the total $1.8 trillion 
under management by our sample of fund managers. In addition to report- 
ing the local bias measure, LB, Table II also reports the components that 
comprise the LB statistic. Column 2, for instance, reports the average dis- 
tance fund managers are from the securities they hold in their portfolios 
13 Of course, if location is endogenous, and, under the null, distance is unimportant, then 
there is no ex ante reason why aggressive growth fund managers should be located near growth 
stocks. In this case, the benchmark model of the CAPM (market portfolio) seems appropriate 
for all subsets of fund managers. We ran both sets of tests, however, for robustness, and found 
very little difference in the results. Therefore, compared to the average manager in the econ- 
omy, and compared to the average manager in a particular subset, the preference for local 
equities is exhibited strongly. 
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Table II 
Test for Local Equity Preference among All Nonindex Funds 
Tests for local bias are reported for the 2,183 nonindex funds in our sample (1,836 excluding 
funds based in New York City). All combinations of equal-weighted and value-weighted funds 
and firms are reported, where value weights for firms (M) are the firm's fraction of total 
market capitalization, and value weights for funds (w) are the fund's fraction of total aggregate 
asset value under management. Also reported are the components that comprise the local bias 
statistic, LB. Column 2, for instance, reports the average distance fund managers are from the 
securities they hold in their portfolios (i.e., w'diag(HD')), where w is the weighting vector 
applied to the F funds, H is the (F x n) matrix of actual portfolio weights each of the F fund 
managers applies to the n stocks in the economy, and D is the (F x n) matrix of distances 
between fund managers and the headquarters of each stock in the economy. Column 3 reports 
the average distance fund managers are from their benchmark portfolio (in this case either the 
equal- or value-weighted index), which is computed as w'diag(MD'), where M is the (F x n) 
matrix of benchmark portfolio weights fund managers are compared to. Column 4 reports the 
difference between columns 2 and 3, which represents how much closer (in km) managers are 
actually investing their money relative to their benchmark portfolio. Column 5 reports the LB 
measure (reported as a percentage), which is w'diag((M - H)(D'(DM)-l)). t-statistics for LB 
are reported in the last column. Tests are also run excluding funds located in New York city. 
Avg. Distance from 
Weights: Percentage Bias 
Funds (w)-Firms (M) Holdings Benchmark Difference (LB) t-stat 
Equal-Equal 1654.18 1814.59 160.41 9.32 14.28 
Equal-Value 1654.18 1830.32 176.15 10.31 15.93 
Value-Equal 1663.09 1833.30 170.21 10.27 15.21 
Value-Value 1663.09 1847.44 184.35 11.20 16.82 
Equal-Equal (ex-NYC) 1685.73 1841.03 155.30 8.95 13.36 
Value-Value (ex-NYC) 1734.71 1892.32 157.61 9.61 13.95 
(i.e., w'diag(HD')). Column 3 reports the average distance fund managers 
are from their benchmark portfolio (in this case either the equal-weighted or 
value-weighted index), which is computed as w'diag(MD'). Column 4 re- 
ports the difference between columns 2 and 3, which represents how much 
closer (in km) managers are actually investing their money relative to their 
benchmark portfolio. Finally, column 5 reports the LB measure (reported as 
a percentage), which is w'diag(M - H)(D'(DM)-1)). 
Table II shows that, on average, fund managers are 1,654 to 1,663 kilo- 
meters away from the securities they choose to hold, and 1,814 to 1,847 
kilometers away from their benchmark portfolio. Thus, the average man- 
ager invests in securities that are 160 to 184 kilometers closer to her than 
her benchmark. In percentage terms, managers are investing in securities 
that are 9.32 percent to 11.20 percent closer to them than the average se- 
curity in their benchmark portfolio. From columns 5 and 6, we see that the 
null hypothesis of no local bias is soundly rejected in all test specifications, 
and appears to be economically significant. 
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Finally, since many firms and funds are clustered around New York City 
(NYC), our finding of a local bias may be driven by the exogenous concen- 
tration of companies and managers in this area. Therefore, we remove the 
347 New York City-based fund managers from our sample, defined as those 
managers located within 100 km of downtown New York, and recompute our 
test statistics. As Table II shows, the existence of a strong proximity pref- 
erence is robust to the exclusion of NYC fund managers. 
A.1. Regional, Sector, and Small-Cap Funds 
We consider the possibility that our results may be driven by a particular 
class of fund managers. For instance, a number of funds invest only in stocks 
from a particular region. If location is unimportant for investing, then these 
funds could presumably be run from any location, and thus do not necessar- 
ily need to be located in the same region they are investing. However, it is 
interesting to see if there remains a predominant local bias once we exclude 
regional funds. 
We also control for two other types of funds: sector and small-cap funds. 
Sector funds are excluded because stocks in the same industry or sector tend 
to cluster geographically, and thus may provide another interesting subset of 
funds to examine. Additionally, because of the large number of funds focus- 
ing on small capitalization stocks, it is interesting to determine if these funds 
primarily drive the local bias phenomenon. Before excluding these funds 
from the analysis, however, we run our tests on each of these subsets of 
funds individually. Results are presented for tests in which firms and funds 
are both equally weighted and value weighted. As stated earlier, the bench- 
mark portfolios are adjusted in each test to reflect the equal- and value- 
weighted portfolio appropriate for the class of manager being tested. Thus, 
for small-cap funds, the appropriate benchmark portfolio is the aggregate 
small-cap fund holdings of all stocks held by at least one small-cap fund 
manager. In other words, deviations in portfolio weights of a particular man- 
ager are measured relative to the aggregate holdings of all small-cap man- 
agers. Similar benchmarks are employed for the regional and sector funds, 
as well as for all other funds not classified under any of these categories. 
As Table III demonstrates, the 14 regional funds exhibit a considerable 
local bias. The average regional fund holds a portfolio biased between 42 
and 53 percent in favor of local securities. This provides additional evidence 
that investors prefer to be near the pool of investments from which they 
select, for if investors had no preference for investing in nearby securities, 
then a fund such as Capital Consultants' WestCap Equity fund (a fund fo- 
cusing on companies headquartered in the 10 western states) could be just 
as easily run out of New York City as out of Portland, Oregon, its current 
headquarters. 
The local bias results for sector and small-cap funds are somewhat more 
ambiguous, and depend heavily on whether equal-weighted or value- 
weighted specifications are employed. The 85 sector funds exhibit between 
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Table III 
Test for Local Equity Preference across Fund Types 
Tests are reported for local bias among four subsets of funds: regional, sector, small-cap, and all 
others. For each subset of funds, the number of managers, average weighted distance from 
securities held, average distance from the relevant benchmark portfolio, and the difference 
between these two measures (both in actual km and in percentage terms) are reported. The 
benchmark portfolio consists of only those stocks being held by at least one fund in the subclass 
of funds being analyzed. Both equal- and value-weighting schemes are employed to funds and 
firms, and t-statistics on the local bias measure are provided in the last column. 
Weights: Avg. Distance from 
Fund Type Firms-Funds Holdings Benchmark Difference Percentage Bias t-stat 
Regional: Equal-Equal 705.73 1593.25 887.52 53.06 6.55 
(n = 14) Value-Value 983.60 1701.82 718.21 41.79 4.89 
Sector: Equal-Equal 1737.04 1801.11 64.07 3.18 0.78 
(n = 85) Value-Value 1672.43 1892.85 220.42 11.62 2.79 
Small-cap: Equal-Equal 1755.36 1879.40 124.03 5.69 3.88 
(n = 435) Value-Value 1814.25 1758.25 -55.99 -5.52 -3.69 
All others: Equal-Equal 1625.83 1793.85 168.02 10.24 14.03 
(n = 1676) Value-Value 1645.27 1853.81 208.54 12.74 16.80 
3.2 percent and 11.6 percent local bias, whereas the 435 small-cap funds 
exhibit between 5.7 percent and -5.5 percent bias. Since both types of funds 
are more constrained in terms of the set of securities in which they may 
invest, these results are not entirely unexpected. For example, an automo- 
tive sector fund located on the east coast simply will not be in a position to 
bias locally since there are few local automotive firms. Likewise, the scope 
for investment by small-cap funds is limited to regions experiencing high 
economic growth, independent of their proximity to the manager. On the 
other hand, if distance is important, managers of such funds should locate 
near the pool of securities in which they expect to invest, much like the 
regional funds appear to do. One reason this may not be taking place is that, 
unlike regional funds, small-cap and sector funds are usually part of a large 
investment firm's family of funds. Therefore, a firm such as Fidelity, with 
more than 30 different sector funds, will be highly limited in its ability to 
locate near the firms in each of these sectors; thus the degree of local bias 
among sector funds may be somewhat weak. The same may be true for small- 
cap funds. 
This is consistent with the empirical evidence as regional funds are typ- 
ically run by a single manager from a small investment firm, while both 
sector and small-cap funds are generally part of the largest investment firms' 
array of funds. However, the negative local bias measure for the value- 
weighted specification of small-cap funds is puzzling, although this appar- 
ent preference for geographically remote firms is quite small, only 56 km 
farther away than the average small capitalization stock. Most important, 
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however, is that when regional, sector, and small-cap funds are removed 
from the sample, the degree of local bias increases to between 10.2 percent 
and 12.7 percent, verifying that the preference for proximate investments is 
indeed a broad phenomenon not driven by or restricted to a particular class 
of fund managers. 
B. Comparison to International Home Bias 
Thus far, we have established that a significant geographic preference for 
proximate firms exists among professional money managers within a domes- 
tic setting. An interesting question is: How important is this proximity pref- 
erence in the international setting? To get a qualitative idea of the significance 
of our results in the context of the international home bias evidence, we 
project our findings onto the international scale by extrapolating our results 
using global distances. In this way, we can obtain a rough measure of how 
much of the home bias in international portfolios can be attributed solely to 
a preference for geographic proximity. 
Our most conservative domestic results, when firms and managers are 
equally weighted, reveal a 9.32 percent local bias, where the average secu- 
rity is 1815 kilometers away from the average fund manager. Determining 
how much of the international home bias can be attributed to a preference 
for local securities, given the vast distances separating investors from po- 
tential investments in the global setting, may be difficult. One possibility is 
to simply allow for a linear extrapolation of our results; to shift 9.32 percent 
of the market capitalization weight of a country in the global market port- 
folio to the domestic economy for every 1,815 kilometers that separate the 
country from the investor. A potential problem with this approach is that it 
may induce short positions in very distant countries. Another possibility, is 
to reduce overseas holdings proportionately, by shifting 9.32 percent of the 
country's remaining portfolio weight to the domestic economy for every 1,815 
kilometers that separate the country and the investor. Denoting s as the 
home country's share of the world market and d as its distance from the 
United States investor, each country's distance-adjusted portfolio share is 
computed as sd = S * (1 - 0.0932)d/1815. Table IV compares the weights of 
Japan, the U.K., France, Germany, Canada, and the United States in the 
world market portfolio to weights of portfolios constructed using propor- 
tional extrapolation of our calculated domestic distance effect to inter- 
national scales, and to French and Poterba's (1991) estimates of the U.S. 
portfolio share allocated among these countries at the end of 1989. 
As illustrated in Table IV, distance may indeed account for a substantial 
portion of the home bias phenomenon. The distance-adjusted portfolio weights 
appear to move portfolio shares about one-third of the way between the 
market and actual weights. In other words, perhaps as much as one-third of 
the home-bias puzzle is not an international puzzle at all, but merely a 
feature of the scale of the world economy and a preference for proximate 
investments. The distance or proximity effect explains some of the relative 
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Table IV 
The Distance Effect on U.S. Equity Portfolio Weights 
Market capitalization weights of the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
and Canada in the world market portfolio are compared to actual weights assigned by U.S. 
investors to these countries based on the results from French and Poterba (1991) using 1989 
capital flows data, and to distance-adjusted weights calculated by shifting 9.32 percent of a 
country's remaining market capitalization weight to the United States for every 1,815 km that 
separate the country from the United States (New York City). Denoting s as each country's 
share of the world market and d as its distance from the United States, each country's distance- 
adjusted portfolio share is computed as sd = s * (1 - 0.0932)d/185 
Portfolio Weights Distance 
Market Weight Actual Weight Distance-Adjusted (km) 
U.S. (New York) 0.478 0.938 0.655 0 
Japan (Tokyo) 0.265 0.031 0.147 10918 
U.K. (London) 0.138 0.011 0.102 5602 
France (Paris) 0.043 0.005 0.031 5871 
Germany (Frankfurt) 0.038 0.005 0.028 6042 
Canada (Toronto) 0.038 0.010 0.037 551 
U.S. holdings as well. For example, Canadian equities represent a smaller 
share of the world portfolio than those of either Germany or France and yet 
account for twice as much of the average U.S. portfolio. When distance is 
taken into account, the picture improves substantially, as the Canadian 
distance-adjusted weight is larger than that of Germany or France, consis- 
tent with the actual weights U.S. investors assigned to these countries. 
The above computations raise several issues worth considering. First, our 
measures of local bias focus solely on investment manager holdings. How- 
ever, since individual investors hold almost half of all U.S. equity, a measure 
of their degree of local preference is required for a complete assessment of 
the distance effect in both domestic and international settings. However, our 
calculations for fund manager local preference may be closer to a lower bound 
on individual investor local preferences, since individuals likely exhibit stron- 
ger geographic preferences than professional money managers. For instance, 
if local equity preference is the result of a local information advantage, then 
individual investors trading distant securities are expected to be at an even 
greater disadvantage than institutional investors, who have extensive re- 
sources, research facilities, and contacts that make information easier to 
acquire. The international evidence appears to support this view, as insti- 
tutions account for a relatively large share of U.S. investment holdings abroad. 
Thus, our results appear conservative, and will likely be strengthened if 
individual investor preferences are included. 
Second, we should consider the possibility that although managers bias 
locally, clients of the fund may diversify geographically among managers. 
Thus, the correct metric to apply to the international setting is actually a 
product of clients' local manager preference, and managers' local stock pref- 
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erence. This issue is addressed by Coval and Moskowitz (1998b), who inves- 
tigate client selections of investment managers and find that clients tend to 
invest with managers who are approximately 30 percent closer than the 
average manager. When extrapolated to international distances, this sug- 
gests that clients are highly averse to investing with managers based over- 
seas. As a result, we remain confident that the above calculations, though 
somewhat crude, are a fairly realistic picture of the effect of distance on 
international portfolio holdings. 
Finally, distance itself, particularly in the international context, might be 
more usefully thought of in terms of "economic distance." For example, com- 
pared with Paris, in economic terms London may be considerably closer to 
New York than the 269 kilometer (4.5 percent) difference in physical dis- 
tance suggests. Integrating information contained in varying languages, cul- 
tures, airline routes, and phone rates, for example, may provide a richer 
characterization of the financial frictions associated with geographic dis- 
tance. Qualitatively, however, geographic distance alone appears relevant 
for both domestic and international portfolio choice. 
III. Local Bias and Firm Characteristics 
More generally, whether or not a geographic proximity preference is re- 
sponsible for or contributes to the international home bias phenomenon, we 
wish to understand why a proximity preference exists, particularly among 
professional money managers. In this section, we examine whether the pref- 
erence for local equities varies across different kinds of firms. Identifying 
traits common to locally favored firms will improve our understanding of 
why investment managers bias their portfolios locally. We begin by examin- 
ing the relation between the propensity to invest locally and a variety of 
firm characteristics, including accounting numbers, market values, employ- 
ment figures, and sector data. 
A. Regression Specification 
Our dependent variable in the following analysis is the local bias exhib- 
ited by a fund manager (in percentage terms) in a particular holding, thus 
preserving potential information contained in the cross-sectional variation 
within a given manager's portfolio. For instance, if fund manager i holds 10 
securities in her portfolio, then the distance between her and the first se- 
curity she holds, multiplied by the difference between the benchmark weight 
applied to that security and the actual weight she applies, scaled by the 
average distance she is from her benchmark, is the first observation of the 
dependent variable. Formally, this first sample point for the dependent vari- 
able can be expressed as 
Yi1 = (mi,1 - hi,1) d[i (7) 
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This calculation is repeated for the nine other securities fund manager i 
holds in her portfolio. The cross section of these 10 local bias measures are 
then regressed on the various characteristics of the 10 securities she chose 
to hold. This allows us to gauge the influence (if any) that the type of firm 
has on the propensity for fund manager i to invest locally. Hence, the re- 
gression coefficients can be interpreted as the increase in (percent) local 
bias of a particular holding when the firm characteristic is one unit larger. 
This regression is run across all fund managers, where the dependent vari- 
able is an (N x 1) vector of local bias measures, with N being the total 
number of fund manager holdings (N = 18,187). 
The cost of such an approach is that now the error terms will no longer be 
independent across a particular manager's portfolio. To accommodate this 
correlation, we run a Feasible Generalized Least Squares regression (FGLS) 
to allow for nonzero off-diagonal elements of the error variance-covariance 
matrix. Specifically, letting Y be the (N x 1) vector of dependent variables, 
and defining X as the (N x k) matrix of independent variables, where k is 
the number of firm characteristics we explore to describe the degree of local 
bias, our regression model is expressed as 
y X/ +E, (8) 
E (,E') o 2 (9) 
where ,/ is the (k x 1) vector of coefficients on the firm characteristics, O-2 iS 
a scalar, and fl is an (N x N) matrix with element i,j = 1 if i = j, wij = P 
if holdings i and j belong to the same fund manager, and i j = 0 otherwise. 
Using the iterative two-step procedure of Oberhofer and Kmenta (1974), we 
estimate p jointly with /3 and o(2 
B. Multivariate Regressions 
For brevity, the results reported for the remainder of the paper correspond 
to a benchmark portfolio of the equal-weighted index. However, our results 
are largely unchanged when we use a value-weighted index as the bench- 
mark for the dependent variable. The first three regressions incorporate the 
same firm characteristics as those in Kang and Stulz (1997): firm size (mar- 
ket capitalization), leverage, current ratio, return on assets, and market-to- 
book ratio. A fourth regression adds firm employees and a tradable/ 
nontradable dummy variable explained below. 
The first regression (regression A) includes only the log of firm size. As 
mentioned earlier, Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign investors over- 
weight large firms when investing in Japanese equities. They argue that 
this behavior may be related to the lower information asymmetries associ- 
ated with large firms. Including firm size in our regression allows us to 
address whether this effect is present within a domestic setting and thus 
whether it is related to distance. 
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In regression B, we add to the first regression a pair of accounting figures: 
leverage and the current ratio. Leverage, defined as the ratio of total liabil- 
ities to total assets, is often used as a measure of firm distress, and the 
current ratio, which measures the ratio of current assets to current liabili- 
ties, captures the short-run financial health of a firm. Thus, the current 
ratio complements the leverage variable, allowing us to identify the horizon 
at which financial distress may be most important. 
In regression C, we add return on assets and the market-to-book ratio to 
the other three firm characteristics. A firm's return on assets (ROA), defined 
as the ratio of income before extraordinary items divided by total assets plus 
accumulated depreciation, is a useful measure of accounting performance. 
Firm market-to-book ratios provide a measure of a firm's potential growth 
and may indicate whether managers prefer local firms which have experi- 
enced price run-ups and whose market values may reflect substantial growth 
opportunities. It is also possible that the market-to-book ratio represents a 
systematic firm distress factor as Chan and Chen (1988) and Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1996) argue. If market-to-book ratios signal the expo- 
sure of firms to an economy-wide distress factor, then we can see whether 
investors respond differently to a firm's relative distress sensitivity, depend- 
ing on their proximity to the firm. 
Finally, in regression D, we look at the number of employees of the firm 
and the tradability of firm output in relation to local bias, by adding these 
variables to our model. The number of employees helps determine whether 
managers obtain information from the labor side of production. In particu- 
lar, if managers obtain private information through the employees of local 
firms, manager holdings may be concentrated in firms with more employees. 
The number of employees also provides a non-market value measure of a 
firm's size. To assess the impact of output tradability, we include a dummy 
variable identifying firms that had positive total foreign sales recorded in 
COMPUSTAT's 1994 Geographic Segment File. Of our sample of firms, 37 
percent are assigned a traded-goods indicator (i.e., had positive foreign sales). 
Examining output tradability is supported by a number of authors who have 
argued that investors may be concerned with the correlation between the 
return on their investments and the degree of availability of the goods that 
they consume.14 In particular, Stockman and Dellas (1989) argue that inves- 
tor concern over the correlation between investment returns and their con- 
sumption of nontraded goods compels them to hold equity in firms that produce 
these goods. If these motives are important for investment managers, we 
should expect them to overweight local firms that produce nontradable goods. 
However, our measure of tradability, whether a firm had positive foreign 
sales, is probably a very crude measure of the tradability of a firm's output 
14 This proposed relation is not necessarily straightforward. For examples of such models, 
see Stulz (1981b), Adler and Dumas (1983), Stockman and Dellas (1989), Backus and Smith 
(1993), Tesar (1993), Uppal (1993), Ghosh and Pesenti (1994), and Serrat (1997). 
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in a domestic setting. Some of the firms with no foreign sales do in fact 
produce goods not easily transferable across distances (i.e., construction, high- 
ways, services, etc.), but others may produce highly tradable products that 
simply do not traverse international boundaries for any number of reasons. 
Thus, the tradable dummy variable may be better interpreted in an infor- 
mational role, as Kang and Stulz (1997) suggest, where the relation between 
the export propensity of firms and foreign ownership may be due to infor- 
mation asymmetries rather than concerns for hedging nontradable goods.15 
C. Empirical Results 
Table V reports the results of our regressions of local bias on these various 
firm characteristics. As the table demonstrates, size, leverage, and the traded- 
goods dummy are highly economically and statistically significant in all re- 
gressions. Examining the results from regression A, we see that managers' 
investments in large firms tend to be further away than those in small firms, 
as the size coefficient is significant at the five percent level. Controlling for 
other firm characteristics, primarily leverage, the size coefficient is signif- 
icant at the one percent level. Moreover, a one-standard deviation decrease 
in log-size increases the propensity to invest locally by one and a half per- 
cent, indicating an economically significant relation between size and de- 
gree of local bias as well. This result is consistent with Kang and Stulz 
(1997), who find that foreigners prefer larger firms when investing in the 
Japanese market, and suggests that the preference for large Japanese eq- 
uities is at least partly due to a proximity preference rather than a national 
border effect. 
Turning next to our distress variables, leverage is highly significant, with 
t-statistics over 18, and a one standard deviation increase in leverage is 
associated with holdings biased approximately 10 percent closer to the man- 
ager. When we control for other characteristics, the significance of the le- 
verage coefficient remains unchanged. This result is also consistent with the 
findings of Kang and Stulz (1997), although they find the foreign investor 
preference for low-leverage firms disappears when controlling for size. The 
current ratio, however, is insignificant, suggesting that important firm dis- 
tress information is better captured by the long-run leverage measure than 
the short-run current ratio. 
In regression C, the return on assets is significant at the one percent 
level, indicating that investors favor local firms with relatively poor account- 
ing performance. However, this preference is not manifested in an econom- 
ically important way. To illustrate, consider a holding that has a return on 
assets of 26.9 percent (which is an ROA 20 percent above the mean). Al- 
though fewer than one percent of all holdings enjoy such a high ROA, this 
translates into a decrease in local preference of only 0.33 percent. Thus, a 
15 We thank the referee for pointing this out. 
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Table V 
Multivariate Regression (Firm Characteristics) 
The dependent variable in the following regressions is the local bias exhibited by a fund man- 
ager in a particular holding. The local bias of each holding is calculated as a percentage by 
multiplying the distance between the manager and each of her holdings by the difference be- 
tween her benchmark weight applied to each stock and the actual weight she assigned to each 
stock, divided by the weighted average distance the fund manager is from her benchmark. More 
formally, yi j = (mi,j - h,j)(d,jj/d M), Vi,j, where mi j is the portfolio weight of stock j in fund 
manager i's benchmark portfolio, hi j is the actual weight fund manager i assigns to stockj, d 
is the distance between manager i and stock j, and dY is the weighted average distance be- 
tween manager i and her benchmark (i.e., dA = Ejmjdj j). The regression is run across all 
fund managers and all of their holdings (18,187 observations) on various firm characteristics. 
The benchmark portfolio employed is the equal-weighted index of all stocks held by at least one 
fund. Regressions are run using a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) procedure de- 
scribed in Section III.A, where the correlation estimate, p (%), from that procedure is reported 
at the bottom of the table. Coefficient estimates on the firm characteristics are reported, along 
with their t-statistics in parentheses. 
Regression A B C D 
Constant 22.86** 16.74* 17.48** 17.12** 
(3.50) (2.60) (2.71) (2.33) 
ln(MV) -0.60* - 1.46** - 1.53** - 1.39** 
(-2.07) (-5.04) (-5.20) (-4.10) 
Leverage 42.65** 43.16** 40.60** 
(18.24) (18.33) (16.93) 
Current ratio 0.24 0.26 0.29 
(0.50) (0.55) (0.62) 
Return on assets - 1.25** -1.21** 
(-2.91) (-2.84) 
Market-book ratio 0.15 0.23 
(1.23) (1.85) 
Employees (thousands) 0.02** 
(4.33) 
Tradable dummy -7.91** 
(-6.76) 
p 9.50 8.81 8.79 8.85 
* , ** Significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
firm's return on assets appears, at best, marginally important in accounting 
for local bias. The lack of significance of the market-to-book ratio for ex- 
plaining local bias is likely due to the strong explanatory power of the le- 
verage variable in capturing firm distress. Thus, leverage appears to be the 
only relevant firm distress variable accounting for local bias.16 
16 Fama and French (1992) find that leverage and market to book are redundant firm dis- 
tress factors, but that market to book has stronger explanatory power for capturing cross- 
sectional variation in expected returns. In terms of explaining the propensity to invest locally, 
we find leverage to have greater explanatory power. 
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Finally, in regression D, adding the number of firm employees as well 
as the tradable-goods dummy, both variables are significant at the one per- 
cent level, yet only the traded-goods dummy appears economically im- 
portant. A one-standard deviation increase in number of employees only 
increases local bias by 0.2 percent. On the other hand, holdings of firms 
whose output is nontradable, as measured by an absence of foreign sales, 
exhibit a 7.9 percent greater bias than firms producing tradable goods. 
This finding is consistent with the international evidence of Kang and 
Stulz (1997) who document a preference by foreign investors for firms 
with substantial exports, which may indicate the lower degree of infor- 
mation asymmetry associated with these firms. Likewise, firms with pri- 
marily local sales have higher information costs, and may be difficult to 
evaluate at a distance. The preference of local money managers for these 
firms is consistent with this information story, since local managers, 
who presumably have a local informational advantage, can better exploit 
that advantage in these firms. Furthermore, the strong relation between the 
traded-goods dummy and local bias may lend support to nontraded goods 
hedging explanations for the international home bias puzzle, if the tradabil- 
ity of goods is just as likely associated with distance as it is with political 
boundaries.17 
D. Implications for Informed Trading 
Overall, the regression results are supportive of an information-based ex- 
planation for local equity preference. In addition to the interpretation of our 
results for the traded-goods variable, the relation between the degree of 
proximate investment and size and leverage is perhaps the best evidence of 
an asymmetric information interpretation for the effect of distance on port- 
folio choice. For instance, in Merton (1987), it is argued that there are sev- 
eral important costs associated with the conveyance of useful information 
from the firm to the investor. Not only must the firm take steps toward 
signaling accurate information, but the investor also needs to be equipped to 
receive these signals. Since a particular manager cannot follow all publicly 
traded securities, Merton (1987) argues that investors select specific firms 
for which to incur "receiver set-up costs."18 If such costs are similar in ab- 
solute terms across firm size, then, relative to the costs of trading such 
information (i.e., liquidity costs), these costs are larger in smaller firms. Of 
course, ceteris paribus, investors are compensated for these costs. The ques- 
tion, though, is which investors will do so most willingly? Clearly, investors 
with lower fixed set-up costs will choose to incur the costs. In the present 
17 Whether this is or is not the case is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for an 
analysis of the relative importance of borders and distance in inhibiting the tradability of goods 
between the United States and Canada, see Engel and Rogers (1996). 
1 Merton (1987), p. 489. 
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case, it seems that proximity may be lowering this fixed cost, with small 
firms offering the proportionately largest decline. As a result, local investors 
appear to have the largest comparative advantage informatively trading in 
small firms. 
Our finding that leverage significantly accounts for local bias cannot be 
fully explained by receiver set-up costs, however, as it is difficult to see why 
highly levered firms should have relatively lower set-up costs for local in- 
vestors. The significance of the leverage variable is most likely accounted for 
by its association with future earnings variance. That is, highly levered firms 
have greater future returns uncertainty. In Coval (1996), it is shown that 
this variance is associated with larger holdings by informed investors. Be- 
cause uninformed investors face more severe adverse selection when invest- 
ing in such securities, they hold relatively smaller proportions than informed 
investors. If local investors obtain superior forecasts of future returns, their 
shares should be largest in firms for which these forecasts are most valu- 
able. Of course, the same argument also applies to small firms, whose cash 
flows appear more volatile as well. 
Perhaps the more intriguing result is that the size and leverage firm char- 
acteristics have been identified as significant explanatory variables for the 
cross section of expected returns. Numerous studies have documented the 
apparent abnormal returns associated with small, highly levered firms. Fama 
and French (1992, 1993, 1996) suggest that such firm characteristics proxy 
for earnings risk factors, compensating investors with higher average re- 
turns. This point is consistent with the findings of Shumway (1996), who 
shows that firm size and leverage are important in constructing bankruptcy 
hazard rates. The evidence presented here suggests that because local in- 
vestors have more accurate estimates of future earnings prospects, they may 
expose themselves more willingly to earnings risk factors. In other words, 
investors are willing to place larger and riskier bets on firms they know 
more about. Thus, risky firms (i.e., small, highly levered firms) are more 
likely to be held by local investors. Another possibility is that if size and 
leverage are proxies for systematic risk, then perhaps local investors under- 
stand local firms' exposure to these factors better than do nonlocal investors. 
Thus, an apparent relation between size and leverage and the propensity to 
invest locally will exist. Alternatively, size and leverage may simply proxy 
for the degree of local ownership of a firm, which may measure the degree 
of asymmetric information or adverse selection faced by outside investors. 
These issues are explored in Coval and Moskowitz (1998a) and are left for 
further research. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that if investors can costlessly hold di- 
versified portfolios of distant, small, highly levered securities, abnormal 
returns on such portfolios should eventually be arbitraged away. Distance- 
associated information asymmetries will offer a resolution to the cross- 
sectional returns puzzles only when barriers to such arbitrage activity are 
identified. 
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IV. Manager Characteristics and Local Bias 
In addition to examining the relationship of firm characteristics to local eq- 
uity preference, we also consider manager characteristics associated with this 
preference. Two goals motivate this line of inquiry. First, we are interested in 
determining whether local bias is concentrated among a narrow subset of man- 
agers or is common across the investment management industry. Second, we 
want to know why managers prefer to invest locally, and what drives this prox- 
imity preference. Since the results of the previous section indicate an associ- 
ation between local preference and private information, we look for further 
evidence that locally biased managers obtain superior local information. More- 
over, to verify the robustness of our results, we run our regressions on four dif- 
ferent sets of managers: the full sample, all nonregional and nonsector funds, 
small-cap funds, and all funds that are not regional, sector, or small-cap. 
We consider four manager characteristics. The first, the natural logarithm 
of a fund's total asset value under management, represents fund size as well 
as resources available for investment research. However, although larger 
managers may have a greater ability to obtain information, this information 
is likely to be spread thin across their considerable pool of holdings. The 
second characteristic, a dummy variable indicating whether the, manager 
has any branch offices, is an indirect measure of size and is expected to 
supply two additional characteristics to our study: the geographical disper- 
sion of the investor base and the sources of firm research and information. 
Coval and Moskowitz (1998b) show that firms with subsidiaries have a more 
widely dispersed investor base than those with a single office. Additionally, 
if manager research and information acquisition are carried out at the branch 
level, the indicator variable should capture any effect of geographically dis- 
persed sources of investment research and information. 
Our final two manager variables characterize research styles. Our first 
variable captures the percentage of manager research which is generated 
in-house. If managers invest locally because of some informational advan- 
tage, it may be useful to identify the source of this edge. Presumably, in- 
house information would have an advantage over "street" research in obtaining 
local firm information, to the extent that street research originates in New 
York City and not the manager's city. Our second variable addresses the 
number of companies followed regularly by the manager.19 Again, if local 
equity preference is driven by information asymmetries, it will be helpful to 
understand whether managers obtain information by following a limited num- 
ber of stocks or by casting their net more widely.20 
19 The average percentage of research and number of companies followed regularly are ob- 
tained via a survey questionnaire Nelson's sends to each investment manager. Managers are 
asked to allocate the percentage of research conducted among three categories: (1) in-house, (2) 
on the street, and (3) consultant/other, as well as report the number of firms they follow on a 
"regular basis." 
20 Because of the highly skewed dispersion of this variable, we use the log of the number of 
companies. 
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Table VI 
Multivariate Regression (Firm and Manager Characteristics) 
The dependent variable in the following regressions is the local bias exhibited by a fund man- 
ager in a particular holding. The local bias of each holding is calculated as a percentage by 
multiplying the distance between the manager and each of her holdings by the difference be- 
tween her benchmark weight applied to each stock and the actual weight she assigned to each 
stock, divided by the weighted average distance the fund manager is from her benchmark. More 
formally,ij = (mij - hj,j)(dj,j/c') Vi,j where mij is the portfolio weight of stockj in fund 
manager i's benchmark portfolio, hi j is the actual weight fund manager i assigns to stockj, d 
is the distance between manager i and stock j, and d& is the weighted average distance be- 
tween manager i and her benchmark (i.e., dA = Ejmjjdjj). The regression is run across all 
fund managers and all of their holdings (18,187 observations) on various firm and manager 
characteristics. The benchmark portfolio employed is the equal-weighted index of all stocks 
held by at least one fund. Regressions are run using a Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) procedure described in Section I1LA, where the correlation estimate, p (%), from that 
procedure is reported at the bottom of the table. Finally, regressions are run on the full sample 
of funds, funds not classified as regional (R) or sector funds (S), only small capitalization funds 
(SC), and all funds not classified as regional, sector, or small-cap. Coefficient estimates on the 
firm and manager characteristics are reported, along with their t-statistics in parentheses. 
Regression: Full Sample Non-R,S Small-Cap Non-R,S,SC 
Constant 27.62** 24.23** 74.92** 33.01** 
(2.78) (2.41) (3.24) (2.80) 
ln (MV) - 1.58** - 1.47** -2.87** -2.14** 
(-4.31) (-3.95) (-2.91) (-4.89) 
Leverage 38.53** 38.61** 17.49** 49.16** 
(15.14) (14.93) (3.67) (15.41) 
Current ratio 0.11 0.09 1.79 -0.02 
(0.22) (0.17) (0.87) (-0.03) 
Return on assets -1.16** -1.13** -0.81 -8.53** 
(-2.73) (-2.65) (-1.83) (-4.13) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.28* 0.32* 0.28 0.48** 
(2.17) (2.39) (1.46) (2.67) 
Employees (thousands) 0.02** 0.02** 0.08* 0.02** 
(3.58) (3.70) (2.39) (2.54) 
Tradable dummy -7.67** -7.68** -7.62** -7.21** 
(-6.14) (-6.05) (-2.43) (-5.19) 
ln(Manager assets) -0.06 -0.04 -1.42 0.09 
(-0.16) (-0.11) (-1.66) (0.21) 
Branch office dummy 1.37 1.63 3.64 1.47 
(0.93) (1.10) (1.16) (0.87) 
% Research in-house 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.28) (0.40) (0.19) (0.35) 
ln(companies followed) -0.79 -0.83 0.66 -1.04 
(-1.54) (-1.63) (0.55) (-1.84) 
p 8.60 8.16 6.77 8.58 
*, ** Significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
The results of the manager characteristic regressions are presented in 
Table VI. As shown in the table, neither assets under management nor the 
branch office indicator variable seem to have additional explanatory power 
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for local bias. While a manager's assets seem to be negatively related to local 
bias, with smaller funds more inclined to have a local bias, this result is not 
statistically significant. The branch office dummy, though positively related 
to local bias, is also statistically insignificant. The lack of branch office ex- 
planatory power may be due to two opposing effects. On the one hand, man- 
agers with branch offices have a more geographically dispersed investor base, 
and if their clients' other income sources are not tied to the local economy, 
these managers might be more inclined to have a local bias. On the other 
hand, if these managers obtain substantial information from branch offices, 
any informational advantage they obtain is less likely to be geographically 
concentrated at the headquarters. The net result of these two effects may be 
somewhat ambiguous. 
In-house research is not associated with local bias with any economic or 
statistical significance; however since these data were obtained from sur- 
veys, we question the reliability of this measure and thus place little weight 
on these particular results. Our final variable, the number of firms followed 
regularly by the manager, is of economic but only marginal statistical sig- 
nificance in accounting for local bias. Managers that focus research re- 
sources on a few firms are more inclined to favor those that are geographically 
proximate. A one-standard deviation increase in the log-scaled number of 
firms tracked leads to a decrease in local bias of 1.0 to 1.3 percent. This 
result provides a degree of additional support for an information-based ex- 
planation of the proximity preference. If a manager's comparative advantage 
is obtaining local information, then the optimal allocation of research re- 
sources would suggest they be restricted to the set of local firms. 
Finally, the lack of importance of these manager characteristics in explain- 
ing local bias and the consistency of the size, leverage, and tradable dummy 
coefficients across the four subsets of funds indicate that the preference for 
small, highly levered local firms, which produce nontraded goods, is robust 
across a wide variety of manager and fund types. 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
Although home bias is regarded as an intriguing and important puzzle in 
international finance, researchers differ in explaining why investors consis- 
tently favor domestic securities. Home bias explanations can be assigned to 
two groups: those that rely on national/governmental frictions and those 
that rely on frictions associated with distance. As we demonstrate in this 
study, since the latter set of frictions is not unique to the international econ- 
omy, the distance effect can be gauged by examining domestic investment 
portfolios. Indeed, judging from the domestic evidence in this paper, geo- 
graphic proximity plays an important role in determining investor portfolio 
choice. On an international scale, investment proximity may account for a 
large portion of the observed abstinence in holdings of foreign securities. 
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Furthermore, we identify several firm characteristics that account for a 
substantial fraction of the local equity preference. Specifically, local hold- 
ings tend to be in small, nontraded-goods-producing firms with high degrees 
of financial leverage. These results suggest that information asymmetries 
may be driving the observed preference for geographically proximate firms. 
Moreover, they may indicate an important link between local equity prefer- 
ence and the cross-sectional asset pricing implications associated with size 
and firm distress. Finally, these results are common across a variety of man- 
ager types and fund classes. 
This research suggests a number of promising directions for further in- 
quiry. First, to fully understand the relationship between local equity pref- 
erence and cross-sectional asset pricing anomalies, we need a careful 
measurement of the performance of locally held firms over time.21 Second, 
the definition of firm location could be further explored. For example, a 
firm's location might be more accurately captured by a measure of its eco- 
nomic center of gravity rather than its headquarters address. In particu- 
lar, plant and branch-level employment data could provide a better picture 
of where a firm's operations are concentrated from an economic standpoint. 
Finally, as stated earlier, distance itself might be more usefully thought of 
in terms of "economic distance." Certainly Los Angeles is economically closer 
to New York City than to El Paso, Texas, and this should be reflected in 
air fares or phone rates data for example. Overall, the findings of this 
paper identify geographic proximity as an important dimension to investor 
portfolio choice and raise several potentially interesting issues for further 
research. 
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